Attitudes, Beliefs and Behaviour
Attitude is defined by Eagly& Chaiken(1993), is a favourable or unfavourable evaluation of an object; attitude is also an affect for or against an object(Thurnstone, 1931). Likes/dislikes, love or hate, admiration or scorn, all these preferences involve a positive or negative affect toward or evaluation of some object or circumstance. This can be anything- person(s), group(s), institution(s), belief(s) or a concept such as the attitude itself. More interestingly it is also possible to have attitudes such as self-esteem or self-doubt, where in such a case the self as an object is treated as existing separately from self as evaluator (Rosenberg, 1979). Attitude can also take on more of a generalization, where it loses its clear positive/negative evaluative aspect and suggests a very broad worldview, eg: ‘Women and men are different’.
Attitude can also be expressed as perspective, stance or frame of reference (Geertz, 1973). In a broader sense of the word, it can be thought of as an orientation with regard to anything.
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Beliefs-Attitudes-Intentions-Behaviour
It can be assumed that an attitude itself is an underlying disposition or a hypothetical construct, that is manifested in specific behaviours-directly or indirectly and verbally or nonverbally. Consider below the model constructed by Fishbein and Ajzen(1975):
Beliefs about object X -> Attitude towards X -> Intention toward X -> Behaviour toward X
This model shows that a person’s total set of beliefs about an object leads to an overall tendency towards a positive or negative evaluation; their overall evaluative attitude shapes their intentions to behave in positive or negative ways toward the object; and these intentions (unless checked) lead to behaviours that are, as a whole, positive or negative toward the object.
In the original theory, with relevance to above, the only variable seen to inhibit the translation of belief into behaviour is ‘’subjective norm’’. Subjective norm is defined as an internal representation of how important referents expect one to behave, therefore constraining the expression of attitudes in the form of intention and behaviour. Since beliefs or reasons are often seen as leading to attitudes and attitudes (together with norms) lead via intentions to behaviour, the assumption according to theory of reasoned action, is that human beings usually behave in a sensible manner (Ajzen, 1988).
The concept of beliefs shall be discussed more in depth in section below(Filters) with relevance to the work of Carmen Bostic St.Clair and John Grinder. The matter of fact being is that the process of conscious and unconscious assimilation provide ground-breaking evidence as to why certain people have certain beliefs (and belief systems) as well as the concepts of values and metaprograms (sorting patterns of cognition and perception) which all work through a complex filtering system (on many levels) to give a certain outcome of behaviour.
Fazio (1990) approaches attitude as the starting point not only in relation to behaviour but also to a great degree in relation to beliefs. In his model, he poses that our attitudes can influence our initial perception of an object, shaping our interpretation of exactly what it is. According to Fazio, an attitude is simply ‘’an association in memory between a given object and one’s evaluation of that object’’(Fazio 1990, 81). Thus, the stronger the association the more likely the attitude will be activated from memory when a relevant object is encountered. It is also shown (though response latency) that increased frequency of expressing an attitude, as manipulated by experimenter, increases the likelihood of activation (Powell and Fazio, 1984).
Values, Schemas and Scripts
Value, defined by Rokeach (1973) is ‘’an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable’’ to its opposite. He further argues that values are more important than beliefs, among other reasons because they occupy a more central position than attitudes in one’s personality and are therefore determinants of attitudes as well as of behaviour.
Schema, according to Taylor and Crocker (1981) is a more organized and complex mental construct than an attitude, and one that doesn’t need to have a specific object in the evaluative sense. Thus extraversion-introversion is a schema which involves conceptions about people, used in perceiving the social scene and ‘’filling out’’ incoming sensory data. It is therefore also possible to think of schemas as the belief part of an attitude or of attitudes as a special kind of schema that includes an evaluative component (Pratkanis, 1989).
Scripts, are sometimes treated as schemas, a script is therefore a prescribed sequence of behaviours that occurs in a particular setting, eg. standard behaviours that a person enacts in a restaurant.
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Opinions Vs Attitudes
Opinion even though usually thought of as synonymous with attitude has several distinctions. Firstly, opinions are usually thought to be identical with their specific expression whereas attitudes are thought to be underlying dispositions inferred from opinions and other expressions but not always identical with any single one. Secondly, opinion signifies a more cognitive though not necessarily well thought out, view, whereas attitudes can be treated as emotionally based as well(eg I hate that woman). Lastly, opinion is useful as part of a larger term ‘public opinion’ and the extent to which public opinion is simply an aggregate of individual attitudes is a rather important issue yet one which will settle an answer once concepts of filtering systems are explained below in section.
Filters: Values, Beliefs and Metaprograms
To simplify above aforementioned is to paint a different, simpler and yet more concrete picture of what are values, beliefs and mention briefly metaprograms. Through the thorough work of Neuro Linguistic Programming, we see that the world around us which we perceive and experience through our five senses( visual, auditory, kinaesthetic, olfactory, gustatory) goes through a system of filters which are on different hierarchical levels and as such are conscious and unconscious. Whatever is our input from the environment( through the senses) and here we ascertain that the senses are in full function, the first set of filters are mainly neurological and therefore preconscious. This is very important to note here, preconscious, which means unconscious at particular moment. On this level we are not aware of constraints not until we first access it as an experience which is sensory based, eg. feel a touch; see an image; smell a flower; taste a fruit; hear a sound. It is here that the experience becomes conscious and then goes through a series of other filtering systems such as individual/personal and social/cultural. In order to make sense of the world we linguistically present it in our mind before an outcome or behaviour. In this mental linguistic representation there are yet more filters and here they take on a concrete filtering process. The filtering process composes of values, beliefs, metaprograms, memories(conscious and unconscious). The linguistic representations, before the behavioural output, also go through a system to ascribe meaning which is coded and constructed via 5 senses. Eg: ‘’this tastes like chicken’’; ‘’this tastes a bit like chicken’’; ‘’it is chicken’’; ‘’it isn’t chicken’’; ‘’its beef’’. The final behaviour output will be the outcome of the linguistic mental map that’s expressed through language( and its patterns and models) as well as nonverbal communication.
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The filters go through three processes( which are also terms for metamodel of behaviour) these are: Generalisation: When a specific experience ( or more experiences) are outlined to represent the complete category of which it is also a member. Eg: All women are inadequate; Every man is a charlatan. Distortion: Where the representation of something/someone and its parts are represented differently than how it was originally represented. Eg: ‘’Rich people are selfish’’. Deletion: When portions of the mental map aka deep structure( full linguistic representation) are deleted and don’t appear in the verbal expression aka surface structure. Eg: ‘’I hate her’’.
Without going more into depth of above, we will now move to further levels of filters which are the most important to us here which are: values, beliefs and metaprograms.
Values can be generally termed as what we hold most dear to us, the importance of something/someone and worth. Values also provide our motivations for doing what is deemed important to us in life, as well as offering evaluations. What’s quite important here to mention, once again, is that values are mainly unconscious as well as have a synaesthesia to them. This means that when a value is thought of or expressed there is a strong kinaesthetic attached to the word. They offer us unconscious blueprints which are placed or imprinted through developmental stages of one’s life; institutions of family and environment; personal experiences.
Beliefs, on the other hand, are more conscious than values. They are the generalisations which we make to support our value(s). These generalisations are about ourselves, our actions, intentions, others and systems. Therefore a belief system is a cluster of beliefs that support a value.
Core beliefs and values are formed through conscious and unconscious modelling(identification); significant emotional events which can be either positive or negative; conscious and unconscious decisions we make; and routine experiences and behaviours.
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Value Developmental Stages
Sociologist Morris Massey proposes that we are not born with values but rather that the go through three developmental stages, these are: Imprint Period; Modelling Period; Socialization Period.
The Imprint Period
Up to the age of seven, we are like sponges, absorbing everything around us and accepting much of it as true, especially when it comes from our parents. The confusion and blind belief of this period can also lead to the early formation of trauma and other deep problems. The critical thing here is to learn a sense of right and wrong, good and bad. This is a human construction which we nevertheless often assume would exist even if we were not here (which is an indication of how deeply imprinted it has become).
The Modelling Period
Between the ages of eight and thirteen, we copy people, often our parents, but also others. Rather than blind acceptance of their values, we are trying them on like a suit of clothes, to see how they feel.
The Socialization Period
Between the ages of fourteen and twenty-one, we are very largely influenced by our peers. As we develop as individuals and look for ways to get away from the earlier programming, we naturally turn to people who seem more like us. Other influences at these ages include the media, especially those parts which seem to resonate with our the values of our peer groups.
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In addition to above, Morris Massey also adds three sections in conjunction to the stages:
Pre-moral
In the pre-moral state, we have no real values (we are thus ‘amoral’). Young children are premoral. So also are psychopaths. Our basic nature tells us to be Machiavellian, doing whatever it takes to achieve our goals, even if it means hurting other people.
Conventional
Most people have conventional values, as learned from their parents, teachers and peers. These basically say ‘here are the rules to live in reasonable harmony with other people.’
The bottom line of this state is that we will follow them just so long as we think we need to. We will break our values occasionally, and especially if our needs are threatened or we are pretty sure we can get away with breaking values with nobody else knowing about it.
Principled
When we are truly principled, we believe in our values to the point where they are an integral and subconscious part of our person. Right and wrong are absolute things beyond the person, for example as defined by a religion. The test of a principled person is that they will stick to their values through thick and thin, and even will sacrifice themselves rather than break their principles. Many great leaders were principled (Martin Luther King, Gandhi, etc.). Based on the research of Morris Massey, the influencing factors for values and beliefs are: the immediate family; friends; religion; school; cultural environment; world-wide events; mass thinking.
References:
- Eagly, Alice, and Shelly Chaiken(1993). The Psychology of Attitudes. New York: Harcourt Brace.
- Thurstone, L.L.[1931] 1967. The measurement of social attitudes. Pp.14-25 in Readings in Attitude Theory and Measurement, ed. Martin Fishbein. New York: Wiley.
- Rosenberg, Morris. (1979). Conceiving the Self. New York: Free Press
- Geertz, Clifford(1973). The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books.
- Fishbein, Martin, and Icek Ajzen(1974). Attitudes towards objects as predictors of single and multiple behavioural criteria. Psychological Review 81:59-74.
- Ajzen, Icek(1988). Attitudes, Personality and Behavior. Chicago: Dorsey.
- Carmen, Bostic St.Clair and John Grinder(2001). Whispering in the Wind, 1st ed.
- Fazio, Russell H.(1990). Multiple processes by which attitudes guide behaviour: The mode model as an integrative framework. Pp.75-109 in Advances in Experimental Social Psychology,23, ed. M.P.Zanna. San Diego: Academic.
- Powell,Martha C., and Russell H. Fazio(1984). Attitude accessibility as a function of repeated attitudinal expression. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 10:139-148.
- Taylor, Shelley E., and Jennifer Crocker(1981). Schematic bases of social information processing. Pp.89-133 in Social Cognition, ed. E.T. Higgins, P. Herman, and M.Zanna. Hillsdale, NJ:Erlbaum.
- Pratkanis, Anthony R., Steven J Breckler, and Anthony G. Greenwald(1989). Attitude Structure and Function. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlabum.
- Rokeach, Milton(1973). The Nature of Human Values. New York: Free Press.
- Bandler, Richard and Grinder, John (1975). The Structure of Magic. California: Science and Behavior Books, Inc.
- Bandler, Richard and Grinder, John (1976). The Structure of Magic II. California: Science and Behavior Books, Inc